

“Bertelli provides a valuable resource for those who seek an improved understanding of the major ideas in the literature on the political economy of governance. He explains and applies the major concepts and theories, such as the principal-agent model, screening, signaling, and others, with effective examples. An important addition to graduate and upper-level undergraduate courses on governmental management and administration, public policy, and related topics, and for all scholars seeking a better grasp of this literature and its contributions.” — Hal G. Rainey, The University of Georgia

“The study of public management has undergone a revolution over the past two decades, with new approaches providing fresh insights into long-standing issues. As someone who is both firmly steeped in the traditional concerns and issues and also a major contributor to the new approaches, Tony Bertelli is the perfect person to serve as a tour guide to this revolution. *The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance* is lucid, engaging, and chock full of ideas for scholars and practitioners alike.” — Charles Shipan, University of Michigan

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The Political Economy of PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE

Anthony Michael Bertelli

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Preface

Public administration does not fit neatly within a democratic setting. Madison argued that government would not be necessary “if men were angels.” Likewise, there would be no problem with public management in a constitutional democracy if bureaucrats, contractors, and all others were faithful agents of positive authority. That this is not the case leads directly to the political creation of multifarious institutions that shape, restrict, enable, and motivate the way in which public management is practiced in democracies. This book is about that shaping, restriction, enabling, and motivation. It aims to introduce a political-economic approach to public administration to students at the advanced undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral levels. My hope is that it will also serve applied researchers in public management and allied fields who would like to get an accessible overview of core ideas driving this type of research.

I have thought about writing this book for a very long time. Many conversations over the years have made it possible. Many discussions occurred in the halls and offices of places at which I have studied and worked and at a wide variety of conferences and events. This book profited over time from the comments of Evelyn Brodtkin, Duncan Snidal, Carolyn Heinrich, Ed Jennings, B. Dan Wood, Ken Meier, Eric Gonzalez Juenke, Jeff Lax, Randy Calvert, Steve Kelman, Matt Flinders, Perri 6, Alan Hamlin, Chuck Shipan, Francesca Gains, Larry O’Toole, Ed Kellough, Tony Bovaird, Stu Brettschneider, Charlie Wise, Chris Skelcher, Jamie Carson, Beth Garrett, Dan Carpenter, Shui Yan Tang, Chris Redfearn, Nicole Esparza, Lisa Schweitzer, Elizabeth Graddy, David Suarez, Forrest Maltzman, Michael Bailey, Kevin Quinn, Matthew