

'A milestone in both the theory and practice of strategy'

John Stopford, Emeritus Professor, London Business School

The trusted guide: how to create and implement a powerful, action-oriented strategy that gets results

Richard Rumelt's classic bestseller shows how to cut through the buzz-words and half-baked goals of 'bad strategy' and provides a clear (and entertaining) understanding of how to master the power of 'good strategy'.

For Rumelt, the heart of good strategy is insight into the hidden power in a situation, and an appropriate response – whether launching a new product, heading a school or putting a man on the moon. Drawing on examples of the good and the bad from across all sectors, he shows how this insight can be cultivated with a wide variety of tools that lead to better thinking.

Since its first publication, the book has won fans around the world with its original and pragmatic ideas, and continues to provide a timeless key to developing and implementing a successful strategy.

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GOOD STRATEGY

BAD STRATEGY

INTERNATIONAL BESTSELLER

RICHARD RUMELT

GOOD STRATEGY
BAD STRATEGY

The difference
and why it matters

'A business classic' MANAGEMENT TODAY

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INTRODUCTION

OVERWHELMING OBSTACLES

In 1805, England had a problem. Napoléon had conquered big chunks of Europe and planned the invasion of England. But to cross the Channel, he needed to wrest control of the sea away from the English. Off the southwest coast of Spain, the French and Spanish combined fleet of thirty-three ships met the smaller British fleet of twenty-seven ships. The well-developed tactics of the day were for the two opposing fleets to each stay in line, firing broadsides at each other. But British admiral Lord Nelson had a strategic insight. He broke the British fleet into two columns and drove them at the Franco-Spanish fleet, hitting their line perpendicularly. The lead British ships took a great risk, but Nelson judged that the less-trained Franco-Spanish gunners would not be able to compensate for the heavy swell that day. At the end of the Battle of Trafalgar, the French and Spanish lost twenty-two ships, two-thirds of their fleet. The British lost none. Nelson was mortally wounded, becoming, in death, Britain's greatest naval hero. Britain's naval dominance was ensured and remained unsurpassed for a century and a half.

Nelson's challenge was that he was outnumbered. His strategy was to risk his lead ships in order to break the coherence of his enemy's fleet. With coherence lost, he judged, the more experienced English captains would come out on top in the ensuing melee. Good strategy almost always looks this simple and obvious and does not take a thick deck